ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1484 | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | Defense Evasion |
T1222 | File and Directory Permissions Modification | Privilege Escalation |
T1222.001 | Windows File and Directory Permissions Modification | Defense Evasion |
Detection: Windows AD Object Owner Updated
Description
AD Object Owner Updated. The owner provides Full control level privileges over the target AD Object. This event has significant impact alone and is also a precursor activity for hiding an AD object.
Search
1`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5136
2| stats min(_time) as _time values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14675",AttributeValue,null))) as old_value values(eval(if(OperationType=="%%14674",AttributeValue,null))) as new_value values(OperationType) as OperationType by ObjectClass ObjectDN OpCorrelationID src_user SubjectLogonId DSName
3| rex field=old_value "O:(?P<old_owner>.*?)G:"
4| rex field=new_value "O:(?P<new_owner>.*?)G:"
5| where old_owner!=new_owner ``` optional SID resolution lookups
6| lookup identity_lookup_expanded objectSid as new_owner OUTPUT downLevelDomainName as new_owner_user
7| lookup admon_groups_def objectSid as new_owner OUTPUT cn as new_owner_group
8| lookup identity_lookup_expanded objectSid as old_owner OUTPUT downLevelDomainName as old_owner_user
9| lookup admon_groups_def objectSid as old_owner OUTPUT cn as old_owner_group ```
10| lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string as new_owner_group OUTPUT builtin_group_name as new_owner_group_builtin_group
11| lookup builtin_groups_lookup builtin_group_string as old_owner OUTPUT builtin_group_name as old_owner_group_builtin_group
12| eval user=coalesce(new_owner_user, new_owner_group, new_owner_group_builtin_group, new_owner), previousOwner=coalesce(old_owner_user, old_owner_group, old_owner_group_builtin_group, old_owner)
13| stats values(previousOwner) as previousOwner values(user) as user values(SubjectLogonId) as SubjectLogonId by _time ObjectClass ObjectDN src_user OpCorrelationID DSName
14| `windows_ad_object_owner_updated_filter`
Data Source
No data sources specified for this detection.
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
wineventlog_security | eventtype=wineventlog_security OR Channel=security OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Security |
windows_ad_object_owner_updated_filter | search * |
windows_ad_object_owner_updated_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
Ensure you are ingesting Active Directory audit logs - specifically event 5136. See lantern article in references for further on how to onboard AD audit data. Ensure the wineventlog_security macro is configured with the correct indexes and include lookups for SID resolution if evt_resolve_ad_obj is set to 0.
Known False Positives
Unknown
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
$src_user$ has made $user$ the owner of AD object $ObjectDN$ | 100 | 100 | 100 |
References
-
https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/secauthz/ace-strings
-
https://trustedsec.com/blog/a-hitchhackers-guide-to-dacl-based-detections-part-1-a
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Security |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Security |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 3