This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A who has already permission to create access keys, makes an API call to create access keys for another user B. Attackers have been know to use this technique for Privilege Escalation in case new victim(user B) has more permissions than old victim(user B)
- Type: Hunting
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2022-03-03
- Author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
- ID: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf3d0d111
Kill Chain Phase
- Actions on Objectives
- CIS 13
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 `cloudtrail` eventName = CreateAccessKey userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName),1,0) | search match=0 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` |`aws_createaccesskey_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
aws_createaccesskey_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
Known False Positives
While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.
Associated Analytic Story
|63.0||70||90||User $user_arn$ is attempting to create access keys for $requestParameters.userName$ from this IP $src$|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
source | version: 3