ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1098 | Account Manipulation | Persistence |
T1098.003 | Additional Cloud Roles | Privilege Escalation |
Detection: Azure AD Privileged Role Assigned to Service Principal
Description
The following analytic detects the assignment of privileged roles to service principals in Azure Active Directory (AD). It leverages the AuditLogs log category from ingested Azure AD events. This activity is significant because assigning elevated permissions to non-human entities can lead to unauthorized access or malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, attackers could exploit these service principals to gain elevated access to Azure resources, potentially compromising sensitive data and critical infrastructure. Monitoring this behavior helps prevent privilege escalation and ensures the security of Azure environments.
Search
1`azure_monitor_aad` operationName="Add member to role"
2| rename properties.* as *
3| search "targetResources{}.type"=ServicePrincipal
4| rename initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName as initiatedBy
5| rename targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue as roles
6| eval role=mvindex(roles,1)
7| rename targetResources{}.displayName as apps
8| eval displayName=mvindex(apps,0)
9| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(displayName) as displayName by initiatedBy, result, operationName, role
10| lookup privileged_azure_ad_roles azureadrole AS role OUTPUT isprvilegedadrole description
11| search isprvilegedadrole = True
12| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
13| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
14| `azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_to_service_principal_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source | Supported App |
---|---|---|---|---|
Azure Active Directory Add member to role | Azure | 'azure:monitor:aad' |
'Azure AD' |
N/A |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
azure_monitor_aad | sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_to_service_principal_filter | search * |
azure_ad_privileged_role_assigned_to_service_principal_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the AuditLog log category.
Known False Positives
Administrators may legitimately assign the privileged roles to Service Principals as part of administrative tasks. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
A privileged Azure AD role was assigned to the Service Principal $displayName$ initiated by $initiatedBy$ | 35 | 70 | 50 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | Azure AD |
azure:monitor:aad |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | Azure AD |
azure:monitor:aad |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 4