This analytic identifies
StopLogging events in CloudTrail logs. Adversaries often try to impair their target's defenses by stopping their macliious activity from being logged, so that they may operate with stealth and avoid detection. When the adversary has the right type of permissions in the compromised AWS environment, they may easily stop logging.
- Type: TTP
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2022-07-12
- Author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
- ID: 8a2f3ca2-4eb5-4389-a549-14063882e537
Kill Chain Phase
- CIS 10
1 2 3 4 5 `cloudtrail` eventName = StopLogging eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(requestParameters.name) as stopped_cloudtrail_name by src region eventName userAgent user_arn aws_account_id | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable Cloudtrail logs in your AWS Environment.
Known False Positives
While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.
Associated Analytic Story
|90.0||100||90||User $user_arn$ has stopped Cloudtrail logging for account id $aws_account_id$ from IP $src$|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
source | version: 1