Detection: AWS Defense Evasion Stop Logging Cloudtrail

Updated Date: 2026-05-13 ID: 8a2f3ca2-4eb5-4389-a549-14063882e537 Author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk Type: TTP Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects StopLogging events in AWS CloudTrail logs. It leverages CloudTrail event data to identify when logging is intentionally stopped, excluding console-based actions and focusing on successful attempts. This activity is significant because adversaries may stop logging to evade detection and operate stealthily within the compromised environment. If confirmed malicious, this action could allow attackers to perform further activities without being logged, hindering incident response and forensic investigations, and potentially leading to unauthorized access or data exfiltration.

Search

 1`cloudtrail` eventName = StopLogging eventSource = cloudtrail.amazonaws.com userAgent!=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success
 2  
 3| rename user_name as user
 4  
 5| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
 6    BY signature dest user
 7       user_agent src vendor_account
 8       vendor_region vendor_product
 9  
10| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
11  
12| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
13  
14| `aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
AWS CloudTrail StopLogging	AWS	`'aws:cloudtrail'`	`'aws_cloudtrail'`

Macros Used

Name	Value
cloudtrail	`sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail`
aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter	`search *`

aws_defense_evasion_stop_logging_cloudtrail_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK

+ Kill Chain Phases

+ NIST

+ CIS

- Threat Actors

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1685.002	Disable or Modify Cloud Log	Defense Impairment

Exploitation

DE.CM

CIS 10

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting	Value
Disabled	true
Cron Schedule	`0 * * * *`
Earliest Time	`-70m@m`
Latest Time	`-10m@m`
Schedule Window	`auto`
Creates Finding (Notable)	Yes
Rule Title	`%name%`
Rule Description	`%description%`
Notable Event Fields	user, dest
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event)	No

TTP detections generate a Finding (Notable) and may generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events) for associated entities.

Implementation

You must install Splunk AWS Add on and enable Cloudtrail logs in your AWS Environment.

Known False Positives

While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has stopped cloudtrail logging. Please investigate this activity.

Associated Analytic Story

AWS Defense Evasion

Finding

Title	Entity Field	Entity Type	Risk Score
User $user$ has stopped Cloudtrail logging for account id $vendor_account$ from IP $src$	user	user	50

Threat Objects

Field	Type
src	ip_address

References

https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008/

Detection Testing

Test Type	Status	Dataset	Source	Sourcetype
Validation	✅ Passing	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit	✅ Passing	Dataset	`aws_cloudtrail`	`aws:cloudtrail`
Integration	✅ Passing	Dataset	`aws_cloudtrail`	`aws:cloudtrail`

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 12