ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1098.003 | Additional Cloud Roles | Persistence |
Detection: Azure AD Admin Consent Bypassed by Service Principal
Description
The following analytic identifies instances where a service principal in Azure Active Directory assigns app roles without standard admin consent. It uses Entra ID logs from the azure_monitor_aad
data source, focusing on the "Add app role assignment to service principal" operation. This detection is significant as it highlights potential bypasses of critical administrative consent processes, which could lead to unauthorized privileges being granted. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow attackers to exploit automation to assign sensitive permissions without proper oversight, potentially compromising the security of the Azure AD environment.
Search
1`azure_monitor_aad` (operationName="Add app role assignment to service principal" OR operationName="Add member to role*") src_user_type=servicePrincipal
2| rename properties.* as *
3| eval roleId = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 0)
4| eval roleValue = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 1)
5| eval roleDescription = mvindex('targetResources{}.modifiedProperties{}.newValue', 2)
6| eval user_id = mvindex('targetResources{}.id', 0), user=coalesce(user,mvindex('targetResources{}.displayName', 0))
7| rename initiatedBy.app.displayName as src_user
8| stats count earliest(_time) as firstTime latest(_time) as lastTime by src_user user user_id roleId roleValue roleDescription
9| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
10| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
11| `azure_ad_admin_consent_bypassed_by_service_principal_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source | Supported App |
---|---|---|---|---|
Azure Active Directory Add app role assignment to service principal | Azure | 'azure:monitor:aad' |
'Azure AD' |
N/A |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
azure_monitor_aad | sourcetype=azure:monitor:aad |
azure_ad_admin_consent_bypassed_by_service_principal_filter | search * |
azure_ad_admin_consent_bypassed_by_service_principal_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
You must install the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Microsoft Cloud Services from Splunkbase(https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/3110/#/details). You must be ingesting Azure Active Directory events into your Splunk environment. This analytic was written to be used with the azure:monitor:aad sourcetype leveraging the Auditlog log category
Known False Positives
Service Principals are sometimes configured to legitimately bypass the consent process for purposes of automation. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
Service principal $src_user$ bypassed the admin consent process and granted permissions to $user$ | 54 | 90 | 60 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | Azure AD |
azure:monitor:aad |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | Azure AD |
azure:monitor:aad |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 3