This search looks for AWS CloudTrail events where a user A(victim A) creates a login profile for user B, followed by a AWS Console login event from user B from the same src_ip as user B. This correlated event can be indicative of privilege escalation since both events happened from the same src_ip
- Type: TTP
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2021-07-19
- Author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
- ID: 2a9b80d3-6340-4345-11ad-212bf444d111
Kill Chain Phase
- Actions on Objectives
- CIS 13
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 `cloudtrail` eventName = CreateLoginProfile | rename requestParameters.userName as new_login_profile | table src_ip eventName new_login_profile userIdentity.userName | join new_login_profile src_ip [ | search `cloudtrail` eventName = ConsoleLogin | rename userIdentity.userName as new_login_profile | stats count values(eventName) min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.principalId user_arn new_login_profile src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`] | `aws_createloginprofile_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that aws_createloginprofile_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
How To Implement
You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.
Known False Positives
While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created a login profile for another user.
Associated Analytic story
|72.0||90||80||User $user_arn$ is attempting to create a login profile for $requestParameters.userName$ and did a console login from this IP $src_ip$|
source | version: 2