ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1586 | Compromise Accounts | Resource Development |
T1586.003 | Cloud Accounts | Resource Development |
T1110 | Brute Force | Credential Access |
Detection: ASL AWS Credential Access RDS Password reset
Description
The following analytic detects the resetting of the master user password for an Amazon RDS DB instance. It leverages AWS CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake to identify events where the ModifyDBInstance
API call includes a new masterUserPassword
parameter. This activity is significant because unauthorized password resets can grant attackers access to sensitive data stored in production databases, such as credit card information, PII, and healthcare data. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to data breaches, regulatory non-compliance, and significant reputational damage. Immediate investigation is required to determine the legitimacy of the password reset.
Search
1`amazon_security_lake` api.operation=ModifyDBInstance OR api.operation=ModifyDBCluster
2| spath input=api.request.data
3| search masterUserPassword=*
4| fillnull
5| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by api.operation actor.user.uid actor.user.account.uid http_request.user_agent src_endpoint.ip cloud.region api.request.data
6| rename actor.user.uid as user, src_endpoint.ip as src_ip, cloud.region as region, http_request.user_agent as user_agent
7| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
8| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
9|`asl_aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
ASL AWS CloudTrail | AWS | 'aws:asl' |
'aws_asl' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
amazon_security_lake | sourcetype=aws:asl |
asl_aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter | search * |
asl_aws_credential_access_rds_password_reset_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The detection is based on Amazon Security Lake events from Amazon Web Services (AWS), which is a centralized data lake that provides security-related data from AWS services. To use this detection, you must ingest CloudTrail logs from Amazon Security Lake into Splunk. To run this search, ensure that you ingest events using the latest version of Splunk Add-on for Amazon Web Services (https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/1876) or the Federated Analytics App.
Known False Positives
Users may genuinely reset the RDS password.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
User $user$ is seen to reset the password for database
Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
---|---|---|---|
user | user | 49 | src_ip |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | aws_asl |
aws:asl |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | aws_asl |
aws:asl |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 1