Suspicious Changes to File Associations
THIS IS A DEPRECATED DETECTION
This detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported.
Description
This search looks for changes to registry values that control Windows file associations, executed by a process that is not typical for legitimate, routine changes to this area.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2020-07-22
- Author: Rico Valdez, Splunk
- ID: 1b989a0e-0129-4446-a695-f193a5b746fc
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
- Installation
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process_name) as process_name values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent_process_name FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name!=Explorer.exe AND Processes.process_name!=OpenWith.exe by Processes.process_id Processes.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name("Processes")`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| join [
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path=*\\Explorer\\FileExts* by Registry.process_id Registry.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name("Registry")`
| table process_id dest registry_path]
| `suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
suspicious_changes_to_file_associations_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on registry changes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint
datamodel in the Processes
and Registry
nodes.
Known False Positives
There may be other processes in your environment that users may legitimately use to modify file associations. If this is the case and you are finding false positives, you can modify the search to add those processes as exceptions.
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
25.0 | 50 | 50 | tbd |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 4