THIS IS A DEPRECATED DETECTION
This detection has been marked deprecated by the Splunk Threat Research team. This means that it will no longer be maintained or supported.
This search monitors for remote modifications to registry keys.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2020-03-02
- Author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
- ID: c9f4b923-f8af-4155-b697-1354f5dcbc5e
Kill Chain Phase
- CIS 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Registry.registry_key_name) as registry_key_name values(Registry.registry_path) as registry_path min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="\\\\*" by Registry.dest , Registry.user | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | `remote_registry_key_modifications_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
remote_registry_key_modifications_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you must populate the
Endpoint data model. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black, or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry. Deprecated because I don't think the logic is right.
Known False Positives
This technique may be legitimately used by administrators to modify remote registries, so it's important to filter these events out.
Associated Analytic Story
- Windows Defense Evasion Tactics
- Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
- Windows Persistence Techniques
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
source | version: 3