Recon Using WMI Class
Description
The following analytic identifies suspicious PowerShell via EventCode 4104, where WMI is performing an event query looking for running processes or running services. This technique is commonly found where the adversary will identify services and system information on the compromised machine. During triage, review parallel processes within the same timeframe. Review the full script block to identify other related artifacts.
- Type: Anomaly
-
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2023-04-14
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 018c1972-ca07-11eb-9473-acde48001122
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Reconnaissance
- Installation
NIST
- DE.AE
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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`powershell` EventCode=4104 (ScriptBlockText= "*SELECT*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Get-WmiObject*") AND (ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_Bios*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_OperatingSystem*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_Processor*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_ComputerSystem*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_PnPEntity*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_ShadowCopy*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_DiskDrive*" OR ScriptBlockText= "*Win32_PhysicalMemory*")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by EventCode ScriptBlockText Computer UserID
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `recon_using_wmi_class_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
recon_using_wmi_class_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- EventCode
- ScriptBlockText
- Computer
- UserID
How To Implement
To successfully implement this analytic, you will need to enable PowerShell Script Block Logging on some or all endpoints. Additional setup here https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
Known False Positives
network administrator may used this command for checking purposes
Associated Analytic Story
- AsyncRAT
- Qakbot
- Industroyer2
- Hermetic Wiper
- LockBit Ransomware
- Malicious PowerShell
- Data Destruction
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
60.0 | 75 | 80 | A suspicious powershell script contains host recon command in $ScriptBlockText$ with EventCode $EventCode$ in host $Computer$ |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2020/05/12/maze-ransomware-1-year-counting/
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/UBA/5.0.4.1/GetDataIn/AddPowerShell#Configure_module_logging_for_PowerShell.
- https://blog.palantir.com/tampering-with-windows-event-tracing-background-offense-and-defense-4be7ac62ac63
- https://static1.squarespace.com/static/552092d5e4b0661088167e5c/t/59c1814829f18782e24f1fe2/1505853768977/Windows+PowerShell+Logging+Cheat+Sheet+ver+Sept+2017+v2.1.pdf
- https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/investigating-powershell-command-and-script-logging/
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/hunting-for-malicious-powershell-using-script-block-logging.html
- https://www.welivesecurity.com/2022/04/12/industroyer2-industroyer-reloaded/
- https://blogs.vmware.com/security/2022/10/lockbit-3-0-also-known-as-lockbit-black.html
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 2