Detection: NET Profiler UAC bypass

Description

The following analytic detects modifications to the registry aimed at bypassing the User Account Control (UAC) feature in Windows. It identifies changes to the .NET COR_PROFILER_PATH registry key, which can be exploited to load a malicious DLL via mmc.exe. This detection leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on specific registry paths and values. Monitoring this activity is crucial as it can indicate an attempt to escalate privileges or persist within the environment. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges, compromising system integrity.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\COR_PROFILER_PATH" Registry.registry_value_data = "*.dll" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.dest 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 12 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
Sysmon EventID 13 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter search *
net_profiler_uac_bypass_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control Defense Evasion
T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Privilege Escalation
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT29
APT37
BRONZE BUTLER
Cobalt Group
Earth Lusca
Evilnum
MuddyWater
Patchwork
Threat Group-3390

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel in the Registry node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.

Known False Positives

limited false positive. It may trigger by some windows update that will modify this registry.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_path$ and key $registry_key_name$ in $dest$ 63 70 90
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 4