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Description

The following analytic detects a process modifying the registry with a known malicious CLSID under InProcServer32. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on registry modifications within the HKLM or HKCU Software Classes CLSID paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to load a malicious DLL, potentially leading to code execution. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to persist in the environment, execute arbitrary code, or escalate privileges, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2024-05-30
  • Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
  • ID: 127c8d08-25ff-11ec-9223-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1218.010 Regsvr32 Defense Evasion
T1112 Modify Registry Defense Evasion
Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
  • DE.CM
CIS20
  • CIS 10
CVE 


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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.dest Processes.process_guid Processes.user 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| join process_guid [
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\CLSID\\{89565275-A714-4a43-912E-978B935EDCCC}\\InProcServer32\\(Default)" by Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.user 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
| fields _time dest registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name process_name process_path process process_guid user] 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, process_name registry_path registry_key_name registry_value_name user 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: malicious_inprocserver32_modification_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • _time
  • dest
  • process_name
  • registry_path
  • registry_key_name
  • registry_value_name
  • user

How To Implement

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

False positives should be limited, filter as needed. In our test case, Remcos used regsvr32.exe to modify the registry. It may be required, dependent upon the EDR tool producing registry events, to remove (Default) from the command-line.

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
80.0 80 100 The $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ modifying the registry with a known malicious clsid under InProcServer32.

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 2