Windows AD Short Lived Server Object
Description
The following analytic identifies a change in an Active Directory environment that could represent evidence of the DCShadow attack. DCShadow allows an attacker who has obtained privileged access to register a rogue Domain Controller (DC). Once registered, the rogue DC may be able to inject and replicate changes in the AD infrastructure for any domain object, including credentials and keys. This technique was initially released in 2018 by security researchers Benjamin Delpy and Vincent Le Toux. Specifically, the detection will trigger when a possible rogue Domain Controller computer object is created and quickly deleted within 30 seconds or less in an Active Directory domain. This behavior was identfied by simulating the DCShadow attack with Mimikatz.
- Type: TTP
-
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2022-10-17
- Author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
- ID: 193769d3-1e33-43a9-970e-ad4a88256cdb
Annotations
Kill Chain Phase
- Installation
- Actions on Objectives
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
CVE
Search
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`wineventlog_security` EventCode=5137 OR EventCode=5141 ObjectDN="*CN=Servers,CN=Default-First-Site-Name,CN=Sites,CN=Configuration*"
| transaction ObjectDN startswith=(EventCode=5137) endswith=(EventCode=5141)
| eval short_lived=case((duration<30),"TRUE")
| search short_lived = TRUE
| stats values(ObjectDN) values(signature) values(EventCode) by _time, Computer, SubjectUserName
| `windows_ad_short_lived_server_object_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
windows_ad_short_lived_server_object_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- EventCode
- ObjectDN
- signature
- SubjectUserName
- Computer
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you ned to be ingesting Event codes 5137
and 5141
. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting Audit Directory Services Changes
within DS Access
needs to be enabled. For these event codes to be generated, specific SACLs are required.
Known False Positives
Creating and deleting a server object within 30 seconds or less is unusual but not impossible in a production environment. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
64.0 | 80 | 80 | Potential DCShadow Attack Detected on $Computer$ |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://www.dcshadow.com/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1207/
- https://stealthbits.com/blog/detecting-dcshadow-with-event-logs/
- https://pentestlab.blog/2018/04/16/dcshadow/
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5137
- https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-5141
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 1