This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2022-02-23
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 25212358-948e-11ec-ad47-acde48001122
Kill Chain Phase
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services*" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data | `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the
Endpoint datamodel in the
Registry node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
Known False Positives
Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common.
Associated Analytic Story
- Active Directory Lateral Movement
- Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
- Windows Persistence Techniques
- Windows Registry Abuse
- Brute Ratel C4
|64.0||80||80||A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
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