Windows Service Creation Using Registry Entry

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Description

This analytic is to look for suspicious modification or creation of registry to have service entry. This technique is abused by adversaries or threat actor to persist, gain privileges in the machine or even lateral movement. This technique can be executed using reg.exe application or using windows API like for example the CrashOveride malware. This detection is a good indicator that a process is trying to create a service entry using registry ImagePath.

• Type: TTP
• Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
• Datamodel: Endpoint
• Last Updated: 2023-04-27
• Author: Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
• ID: 25212358-948e-11ec-ad47-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1574.011	Services Registry Permissions Weakness	Persistence, Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion

Kill Chain Phase

• Installation
• Exploitation

NIST

• DE.CM

CIS20

• CIS 10

CVE

Search

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path="*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services*" Registry.registry_value_name = ImagePath) BY _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

• security_content_summariesonly
• security_content_ctime

windows_service_creation_using_registry_entry_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

• _time
• Registry.dest
• Registry.registry_value_name
• Registry.registry_key_name
• Registry.registry_path
• Registry.registry_value_data
• Registry.process_guid

How To Implement

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the offical Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709

Known False Positives

Third party tools may used this technique to create services but not so common.

Associated Analytic Story

• Active Directory Lateral Movement
• Suspicious Windows Registry Activities
• Windows Persistence Techniques
• Windows Registry Abuse
• Brute Ratel C4

RBA

Risk Score	Impact	Confidence	Message
64.0	80	80	A Windows Service was created on a endpoint from $dest$ using a registry entry

The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

• https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1574.011/T1574.011.md

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

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