Windows Unsigned DLL Side-Loading In Same Process Path
Description
This detection identifies unsigned DLLs loaded through DLL side-loading with same file path with the process loaded the DLL, a technique observed in DarkGate malware. This detection monitors DLL loading, verifies signatures, and flags unsigned DLLs. Suspicious file paths and known executable associations are checked. Detecting such suspicious DLLs is crucial in preventing privilege escalation attacks and other potential security breaches. Regular security assessments, thorough monitoring, and implementing security best practices are essential in safeguarding systems from such threats.
- Type: TTP
-
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2024-06-07
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 3cf85c02-f9d6-4186-bf3c-e70ee99fbc7f
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Installation
- Exploitation
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
`sysmon` EventCode=7 Signed=false SignatureStatus != Valid NOT (Image IN ("*:\\windows\\system32\\*", "*:\\windows\\syswow64\\*", "c:\\Program Files*")) NOT (ImageLoaded IN ("*:\\windows\\system32\\*", "*:\\windows\\syswow64\\*", "c:\\Program Files*"))
| rex field=Image "(?<ImageFolderPath>.+\\\)"
| rex field=ImageLoaded "(?<ImageLoadedFolderPath>.+\\\)"
| where ImageFolderPath = ImageLoadedFolderPath
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ProcessGuid ImageLoaded user Computer EventCode ImageFolderPath ImageLoadedFolderPath Company Description Product Signed SignatureStatus
| rename Computer as dest
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_unsigned_dll_side_loading_in_same_process_path_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
windows_unsigned_dll_side-loading_in_same_process_path_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Image
- ImageLoaded
- Signed
- SignatureStatus
- OriginalFileName
- process_name
- dest
- EventCode
- ProcessId
- Hashes
- IMPHASH
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name and imageloaded executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
Known False Positives
unknown
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
49.0 | 70 | 70 | An unsigned dll module was loaded on $dest$ |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/blog/security/enter-the-gates-an-analysis-of-the-darkgate-autoit-loader.html
- https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/23/b/investigating-the-plugx-trojan-disguised-as-a-legitimate-windows.html
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 1