Detection: Suspicious Process With Discord DNS Query

Description

The following analytic identifies a process making a DNS query to Discord, excluding legitimate Discord application paths. It leverages Sysmon logs with Event ID 22 to detect DNS queries containing "discord" in the QueryName field. This activity is significant because Discord can be abused by adversaries to host and download malicious files, as seen in the WhisperGate campaign. If confirmed malicious, this could indicate malware attempting to download additional payloads from Discord, potentially leading to further code execution and compromise of the affected system.

1`sysmon` EventCode=22 QueryName IN ("*discord*") Image != "*\\AppData\\Local\\Discord\\*" AND Image != "*\\Program Files*" AND Image != "discord.exe" 
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image QueryName QueryStatus process_name QueryResults Computer 
3| rename Computer as dest 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Sysmon EventID 22 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter search *
suspicious_process_with_discord_dns_query_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1059.005 Visual Basic Execution
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution
KillChainPhase.INSTALLATION
NistCategory.DE_AE
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT-C-36
APT32
APT33
APT37
APT38
APT39
BRONZE BUTLER
Cobalt Group
Confucius
Earth Lusca
FIN13
FIN4
FIN7
Gamaredon Group
Gorgon Group
HEXANE
Higaisa
Inception
Kimsuky
Lazarus Group
LazyScripter
Leviathan
Machete
Magic Hound
Malteiro
Molerats
MuddyWater
Mustang Panda
OilRig
Patchwork
Rancor
RedCurl
Sandworm Team
SideCopy
Sidewinder
Silence
TA2541
TA459
TA505
Transparent Tribe
Turla
WIRTE
Windshift
APT19
APT32
APT37
APT39
Dragonfly
FIN5
FIN6
FIN7
Fox Kitten
Ke3chang
OilRig
Saint Bear
Stealth Falcon
Whitefly
Windigo
Winter Vivern

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.

Implementation

his detection relies on sysmon logs with the Event ID 22, DNS Query.

Known False Positives

Noise and false positive can be seen if the following instant messaging is allowed to use within corporate network. In this case, a filter is needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
suspicious process $process_name$ has a dns query in $QueryName$ on $dest$ 64 80 80
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 4