ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1069 | Permission Groups Discovery | Discovery |
T1069.001 | Local Groups | Discovery |
Detection: Get WMIObject Group Discovery
Description
The following analytic detects the use of the Get-WMIObject Win32_Group
command executed via PowerShell to enumerate local groups on an endpoint. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and command-line executions. Identifying local groups can be a precursor to privilege escalation or lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could allow an attacker to map out group memberships, aiding in further exploitation or unauthorized access to sensitive resources.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name=powershell.exe OR processes.process_name=cmd.exe) (Processes.process="*Get-WMIObject*" AND Processes.process="*Win32_Group*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| `get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | N/A | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
Sysmon EventID 1 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Windows Event Log Security 4688 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter | search * |
get_wmiobject_group_discovery_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Risk Event | False |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
False positives may be present. Tune as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
System group discovery on $dest$ by $user$. | 15 | 30 | 50 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
xmlwineventlog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
xmlwineventlog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 2