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Description

This analytic detects a potential usage of secretsdump.py tool for dumping credentials (ntlm hash) from a copy of ntds.dit and SAM.Security,SYSTEM registrry hive. This technique was seen in some attacker that dump ntlm hashes offline after having a copy of ntds.dit and SAM/SYSTEM/SECURITY registry hive.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2023-06-13
  • Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
  • ID: 5672819c-be09-11eb-bbfb-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1003.003 NTDS Credential Access
T1003 OS Credential Dumping Credential Access
Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
  • DE.CM
CIS20
  • CIS 10
CVE 


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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name = "python*.exe" Processes.process = "*.py*" Processes.process = "*-ntds*" (Processes.process = "*-system*" OR Processes.process = "*-sam*" OR Processes.process = "*-security*" OR Processes.process = "*-bootkey*") by Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_guid 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: secretdumps_offline_ntds_dumping_tool_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • _time
  • Processes.process_name
  • Processes.process
  • Processes.parent_process_name
  • Processes.parent_process
  • Processes.dest
  • Processes.user
  • Processes.process_id
  • Processes.process_guid

How To Implement

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

unknown

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
80.0 80 100 A secretdump process $process_name$ with secretdump commandline $process$ to dump credentials in host $dest$

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 1