This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2020-01-28
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122
Kill Chain Phase
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\windir" Registry.registry_value_data = "*.exe*" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Supported Add-on (TA)
List of Splunk Add-on’s tested to work with the analytic.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the
Endpoint datamodel in the
Registry node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.
Known False Positives
Associated Analytic Story
|63.0||70||90||Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
source | version: 2