SilentCleanup UAC Bypass
Description
This search is to detect a suspicious modification of registry that may related to UAC bypassed. This registry will be trigger once the attacker abuse the silentcleanup task schedule to gain high privilege execution that will bypass User control account.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2022-11-14
- Author: Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 56d7cfcc-da63-11eb-92d4-acde48001122
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| join process_guid [
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Environment\\windir" Registry.registry_value_data = "*.exe*") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`]
| fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid
| where isnotnull(registry_value_data)
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
silentcleanup_uac_bypass_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Processes.user
- Processes.dest
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.process_guid
- Registry.dest
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.registry_value_data
- Registry.process_guid
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the offical Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709
Known False Positives
unknown
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
63.0 | 70 | 90 | Suspicious modification of registry $registry_path$ with possible payload path $registry_value_name$ in $dest$ |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME
- https://www.intezer.com/blog/malware-analysis/klingon-rat-holding-on-for-dear-life/
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 3