ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1547.008 | LSASS Driver | Persistence |
Detection: Windows Autostart Execution LSASS Driver Registry Modification
Description
The following analytic detects modifications to undocumented registry keys that allow a DLL to load into lsass.exe, potentially capturing credentials. It leverages the Endpoint.Registry data model to identify changes to \CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\DirectoryServiceExtPt or \CurrentControlSet\Services\NTDS\LsaDbExtPt. This activity is significant as it indicates a possible attempt to inject malicious code into the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS), which can lead to credential theft. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information and escalate privileges within the environment.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\DirectoryServiceExtPt","*\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\NTDS\\LsaDbExtPt") by Registry.registry_key_name Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| `windows_autostart_execution_lsass_driver_registry_modification_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source | Supported App |
---|---|---|---|---|
Sysmon EventID 12 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
N/A |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
windows_autostart_execution_lsass_driver_registry_modification_filter | search * |
windows_autostart_execution_lsass_driver_registry_modification_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint
datamodel in the Registry
node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
Known False Positives
False positives may be present on recent Windows Operating Systems. Filtering may be required based on process_name. In addition, look for non-standard, unsigned, module loads into LSASS. If query is too noisy, modify by adding Endpoint.processes process_name to query to identify the process making the modification.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
The registry values for DirectoryServiceExtPt or LsaDbExtPt were modified on $dest$. | 49 | 70 | 70 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
xmlwineventlog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
xmlwineventlog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 2