Windows Registry Certificate Added
Description
The following analytic detects the installation of a root CA certificate by monitoring specific registry paths for SetValue events. It leverages data from the Endpoint datamodel, focusing on registry paths containing "certificates" and registry values named "Blob." This activity is significant because unauthorized root CA certificates can compromise the integrity of encrypted communications and facilitate man-in-the-middle attacks. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to intercept, decrypt, or manipulate sensitive data, leading to severe security breaches.
- Type: Anomaly
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2024-05-29
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: 5ee98b2f-8b9e-457a-8bdc-dd41aaba9e87
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
NIST
- DE.AE
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path IN ("*\\certificates\\*") AND Registry.registry_value_name="Blob" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_registry_certificate_added_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
windows_registry_certificate_added_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Registry.registry_path
- Registry.registry_key_name
- Registry.registry_value_name
- Registry.dest
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint
datamodel in the Processes
and Registry
node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
Known False Positives
False positives will be limited to a legitimate business applicating consistently adding new root certificates to the endpoint. Filter by user, process, or thumbprint.
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
42.0 | 60 | 70 | A root certificate was added on $dest$. |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://posts.specterops.io/code-signing-certificate-cloning-attacks-and-defenses-6f98657fc6ec
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/tree/master/atomics/T1553.004
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 3