Detection: Windows AD Same Domain SID History Addition

Description

The following analytic detects changes to the sIDHistory attribute of user or computer objects within the same domain. It leverages Windows Security Event Codes 4738 and 4742 to identify when the sIDHistory attribute is modified. This activity is significant because the sIDHistory attribute can be abused by adversaries to grant unauthorized access by inheriting permissions from another account. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to maintain persistent access or escalate privileges within the domain, posing a severe security risk.

 1`wineventlog_security` (EventCode=4742 OR EventCode=4738) NOT SidHistory IN ("%%1793", -) 
 2| rex field=SidHistory "(^%{
 3|^)(?P<SidHistoryMatch>.*)(\-
 4|\\\)" 
 5| rex field=TargetSid "^(?P<TargetSidmatch>.*)(\-
 6|\\\)" 
 7| where SidHistoryMatch=TargetSidmatch OR SidHistoryMatch=TargetDomainName 
 8| rename TargetSid as userSid, TargetDomainName as userDomainName 
 9| table _time action status host user userSid userDomainName SidHistory Logon_ID src_user 
10| `windows_ad_same_domain_sid_history_addition_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
Windows Event Log Security 4738 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'
Windows Event Log Security 4742 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Name Value
wineventlog_security eventtype=wineventlog_security OR Channel=security OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Security
windows_ad_same_domain_sid_history_addition_filter search *
windows_ad_same_domain_sid_history_addition_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1134.005 SID-History Injection Defense Evasion
T1134 Access Token Manipulation Privilege Escalation
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
Blue Mockingbird
FIN6

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting eventcodes 4738 and 4742. The Advanced Security Audit policy settings Audit User Account Management and Audit Computer Account Management within Account Management all need to be enabled. SID resolution is not required..

Known False Positives

Unknown

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
Active Directory SID History Attribute was added to $user$ by $src_user$ 100 100 100
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Security XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Security XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 4