Windows Replication Through Removable Media
Description
The following analytic detects the creation or dropping of executable or script files in the root directory of a removable drive. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Filesystem datamodel, focusing on specific file types and their creation paths. This activity is significant as it may indicate an attempt to spread malware, such as ransomware, via removable media. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could lead to unauthorized code execution, lateral movement, or persistence within the network, potentially compromising sensitive data and systems.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2024-05-14
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 60df805d-4605-41c8-bbba-57baa6a4eb97
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
- Delivery
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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|tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name = *.exe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.dll OR Filesystem.file_name = *.sys OR Filesystem.file_name = *.com OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbs OR Filesystem.file_name = *.vbe OR Filesystem.file_name = *.js OR Filesystem.file_name= *.bat OR Filesystem.file_name = *.cmd OR Filesystem.file_name = *.pif) by Filesystem.file_create_time Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.user Filesystem.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| eval dropped_file_path = split(file_path, "\\")
| eval dropped_file_path_split_count = mvcount(dropped_file_path)
| eval root_drive = mvindex(dropped_file_path,0)
| where LIKE(root_drive, "%:") AND dropped_file_path_split_count = 2 AND root_drive!= "C:"
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_replication_through_removable_media_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
windows_replication_through_removable_media_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Filesystem.file_path
- Filesystem.file_create_time
- Filesystem.process_id
- Filesystem.file_name
- Filesystem.user
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the Filesystem responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint
datamodel in the Filesystem
node.
Known False Positives
Administrators may allow creation of script or exe in the paths specified. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
64.0 | 80 | 80 | executable or script $file_path$ was dropped in root drive $root_drive$ in $dest$ |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/002/
- https://www.fortinet.com/blog/threat-research/chaos-ransomware-variant-sides-with-russia
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 2