Detection: Detect Rundll32 Application Control Bypass - setupapi

Description

The following analytic detects the execution of rundll32.exe loading setupapi.dll and iesetupapi.dll via the LaunchINFSection function. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process creation events and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it indicates a potential application control bypass, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary script code. If confirmed malicious, this technique could enable code execution, privilege escalation, or persistence within the environment, posing a severe threat to system integrity and security.

Search

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_rundll32` Processes.process=*setupapi* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `detect_rundll32_application_control_bypass___setupapi_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2	N/A	'crowdstrike:events:sensor'	'crowdstrike'
Sysmon EventID 1	Windows	'xmlwineventlog'	'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
Windows Event Log Security 4688	Windows	'xmlwineventlog'	'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Annotations

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Although unlikely, some legitimate applications may use setupapi triggering a false positive.

Associated Analytic Story

• Compromised Windows Host

• Living Off The Land

• Suspicious Rundll32 Activity

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

References

• https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/

• https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1218.011/T1218.011.md

• https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Rundll32/

• https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Libraries/Setupapi/

• https://bohops.com/2018/02/26/leveraging-inf-sct-fetch-execute-techniques-for-bypass-evasion-persistence/

Detection Testing

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 6