Linux Possible Access Or Modification Of sshd Config File
Description
The following analytic detects suspicious access or modification of the sshd_config file on Linux systems. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on command-line executions involving processes like "cat," "nano," "vim," and "vi" accessing the sshd_config file. This activity is significant because unauthorized changes to sshd_config can allow threat actors to redirect port connections or use unauthorized keys, potentially compromising the system. If confirmed malicious, this could lead to unauthorized access, privilege escalation, or persistent backdoor access, posing a severe security risk.
- Type: Anomaly
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2024-05-24
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 7a85eb24-72da-11ec-ac76-acde48001122
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Installation
- Exploitation
NIST
- DE.AE
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN("cat", "nano*","vim*", "vi*") AND Processes.process IN("*/etc/ssh/sshd_config") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
linux_possible_access_or_modification_of_sshd_config_file_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_id
How To Implement
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Administrator or network operator can use this commandline for automation purposes. Please update the filter macros to remove false positives.
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
25.0 | 50 | 50 | a commandline $process$ executed on $dest$ |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://www.hackingarticles.in/ssh-penetration-testing-port-22/
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004/
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 2