Try in Splunk Security Cloud

Description

This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the Consent Admin to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2022-01-26
  • Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
  • ID: 7de17d7a-c9d8-11eb-a812-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion
Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
CIS20
CVE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
|rename process_guid as proc_guid 
|join proc_guid, _time [
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
|rename process_guid as proc_guid 
| fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] 
| table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name 
| `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • _time
  • Registry.registry_path
  • Registry.registry_key_name
  • Registry.registry_value_name
  • Registry.dest

How To Implement

To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.

Known False Positives

unknown

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
25.0 50 50 Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation.

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 2