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Description

This analytic identifies a potential privilege escalation attempt to perform malicious task. This registry modification is designed to allow the Consent Admin to perform an operation that requires elevation without consent or credentials. We also found this in some attacker to gain privilege escalation to the compromise machine.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2022-11-14
  • Author: Steven Dick, Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
  • ID: 7de17d7a-c9d8-11eb-a812-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism Privilege Escalation, Defense Evasion
Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
CIS20
CVE 


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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) AS firstTime max(_time) AS lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes BY _time span=1h Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_path Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| join process_guid [ 
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry WHERE (Registry.registry_path= "*\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Policies\\System*" Registry.registry_value_name = ConsentPromptBehaviorAdmin Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000") BY _time span=1h Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.process_guid 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`] 
| fields firstTime lastTime dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process registry_key_name registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data process_guid 
| where isnotnull(registry_value_data) 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: allow_operation_with_consent_admin_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Supported Add-on (TA)

List of Splunk Add-on’s tested to work with the analytic.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • _time
  • Processes.user
  • Processes.dest
  • Processes.process_id
  • Processes.process_name
  • Processes.process
  • Processes.process_path
  • Processes.parent_process_name
  • Processes.parent_process
  • Processes.process_guid
  • Registry.dest
  • Registry.registry_value_name
  • Registry.registry_key_name
  • Registry.registry_path
  • Registry.registry_value_data
  • Registry.process_guid

How To Implement

To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the registry value name, registry path, and registry value data from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 2.0 of the offical Sysmon TA. https://splunkbase.splunk.com/app/5709

Known False Positives

unknown

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
25.0 50 50 Suspicious registry modification was performed on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$. This behavior is indicative of privilege escalation.

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 3