This analytic identifies a suspicious registry modification to hide a user account on the Windows Login screen. This technique was seen in some tradecraft where the adversary will create a hidden user account with Admin privileges in login screen to avoid noticing by the user that they already compromise and to persist on that said machine.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2022-01-28
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: 834ba832-ad89-11eb-937d-acde48001122
Kill Chain Phase
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\SpecialAccounts\\Userlist*" AND Registry.registry_value_data = "0x00000000" by _time span=1h Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.process_guid Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid |join proc_guid, _time [ | tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes by _time span=1h Processes.process_id Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_guid | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` |rename process_guid as proc_guid | fields _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name] | table _time dest user parent_process_name parent_process process_name process_path process proc_guid registry_path registry_value_name registry_value_data registry_key_name | `hide_user_account_from_sign_in_screen_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
hide_user_account_from_sign-in_screen_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- Registry.dest Registry.user
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as CarbonBlack or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.
Known False Positives
Unknown. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
|72.0||90||80||Suspicious registry modification ($registry_value_name$) which is used go hide a user account on the Windows Login screen detected on $dest$ executed by $user$|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
source | version: 2