Extraction of Registry Hives
Description
The following analytic identifies the use of reg.exe
exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials. Adversaries may use this technique to export registry hives for offline credential access attacks. Typically found executed from a untrusted process or script. Upon execution, a file will be written to disk.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2021-09-09
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: 8bbb7d58-b360-11eb-ba21-acde48001122
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
NIST
CIS20
CVE
Search
1
2
3
4
5
6
| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_reg` (Processes.process=*save* OR Processes.process=*export*) AND (Processes.process="*\sam *" OR Processes.process="*\system *" OR Processes.process="*\security *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `extraction_of_registry_hives_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
extraction_of_registry_hives_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Supported Add-on (TA)
List of Splunk Add-on’s tested to work with the analytic.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- Processes.dest
- Processes.user
- Processes.parent_process_name
- Processes.parent_process
- Processes.original_file_name
- Processes.process_name
- Processes.process
- Processes.process_id
- Processes.parent_process_path
- Processes.process_path
- Processes.parent_process_id
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint
datamodel in the Processes
node.
Known False Positives
It is possible some agent based products will generate false positives. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
56.0 | 80 | 70 | Suspicious use of reg.exe exporting Windows Registry hives containing credentials executed on $dest$ by user $user$, with a parent process of $parent_process_id$ |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://www.mandiant.com/resources/shining-a-light-on-darkside-ransomware-operations
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1003.002/T1003.002.md
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 2