Detection: Windows SOAPHound Binary Execution

Description

The following analytic detects the execution of the SOAPHound binary (soaphound.exe) with specific command-line arguments. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names, command-line arguments, and other process-related metadata. This activity is significant because SOAPHound is a known tool used for credential dumping and other malicious activities. If confirmed malicious, this behavior could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information, escalate privileges, or persist within the environment, posing a severe threat to organizational security.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="soaphound.exe" OR Processes.original_file_name="soaphound.exe" AND Processes.process IN ("*--buildcache *", "*--bhdump *", "*--certdump *", "*--dnsdump *", "*-c *", "*--cachefilename *", "*-o *", "*--outputdirectory *") by Processes.process Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| `windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 N/A 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' 'crowdstrike'
Sysmon EventID 1 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
Windows Event Log Security 4688 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter search *
windows_soaphound_binary_execution_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1087.002 Domain Account Discovery
T1069.001 Local Groups Discovery
T1482 Domain Trust Discovery Discovery
T1087.001 Local Account Discovery
T1087 Account Discovery Discovery
T1069.002 Domain Groups Discovery
T1069 Permission Groups Discovery Discovery
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT41
BRONZE BUTLER
Chimera
Dragonfly
FIN13
FIN6
Fox Kitten
INC Ransom
Ke3chang
LAPSUS$
MuddyWater
OilRig
Poseidon Group
RedCurl
Sandworm Team
Scattered Spider
ToddyCat
Turla
Volt Typhoon
Wizard Spider
menuPass
Chimera
HEXANE
OilRig
Tonto Team
Turla
Volt Typhoon
admin@338
Akira
Chimera
Earth Lusca
FIN8
Magic Hound
APT1
APT3
APT32
APT41
Chimera
Fox Kitten
Ke3chang
Moses Staff
OilRig
Poseidon Group
RedCurl
Threat Group-3390
Turla
Volt Typhoon
admin@338
Aquatic Panda
FIN13
Dragonfly
FIN7
INC Ransom
Inception
Ke3chang
LAPSUS$
OilRig
ToddyCat
Turla
Volt Typhoon
APT3
APT41
FIN13
TA505
Volt Typhoon

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

False positives should be limited as the command-line arguments are specific to SOAPHound. Filter as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
The process $process_name$ was executed on $dest$ related to SOAPHound. 80 80 100
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 4