Detection: Windows Kerberos Coercion via DNS

Updated Date: 2026-05-13 ID: 9029b575-6f6b-4ab1-b660-67b24b7e9c3d Author: Raven Tait, Splunk Type: TTP Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

Detects DNS-based Kerberos coercion attacks where adversaries inject marshaled credential structures into DNS records to spoof SPNs and redirect authentication such as in CVE-2025-33073. This detection leverages Windows Security Event Codes 5136, 5137, 4662, looking for DNS events with specific CREDENTIAL_TARGET_INFORMATION entries.

Search

 1`wineventlog_security`  (((EventCode="5136" OR EventCode="5137") ObjectClass="dnsNode" ObjectDN="*1UWhRCA*" ObjectDN="*AAAAA*" ObjectDN="*YBAAAA*") OR (EventCode="4662" AdditionalInfo="*1UWhRCA*" AdditionalInfo="*AAAAA*" AdditionalInfo="*YBAAAA*"))
 2  
 3| eval Object=coalesce(lower(ObjectGUID), trim(AdditionalInfo2, "%{}"))
 4  
 5| eval user=coalesce(SubjectUserName, Caller_User_Name)
 6  
 7| stats min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime values(EventCode) as event_codes values(ObjectDN) as dns_record values(user) as user values(Computer) as dest
 8    BY Object
 9  
10| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
11  
12| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
13  
14| `windows_kerberos_coercion_via_dns_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
Windows Event Log Security 5136	Windows	`'XmlWinEventLog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Security'`
Windows Event Log Security 5137	Windows	`'XmlWinEventLog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Security'`
Windows Event Log Security 4662	Windows	`'XmlWinEventLog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Security'`

Macros Used

Name	Value
wineventlog_security	`eventtype="wineventlog_security" OR Channel="security" OR source="XmlWinEventLog:Security" OR source="WinEventLog:Security"`
windows_kerberos_coercion_via_dns_filter	`search *`

windows_kerberos_coercion_via_dns_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK

+ Kill Chain Phases

+ NIST

+ CIS

- Threat Actors

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1071.004	DNS	Command and Control
T1187	Forced Authentication	Credential Access
T1557.001	Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay	Collection

Exploitation

Command and Control

DE.CM

CIS 10

CVE

CVE-2025-33073

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting	Value
Disabled	true
Cron Schedule	`0 * * * *`
Earliest Time	`-70m@m`
Latest Time	`-10m@m`
Schedule Window	`auto`
Creates Finding (Notable)	Yes
Rule Title	`%name%`
Rule Description	`%description%`
Notable Event Fields	user, dest
Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event)	Yes

TTP detections generate a Finding (Notable) and may generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events) for associated entities.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you ned to be ingesting Event codes 4662, 5136, 5137. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting Audit Directory Services Changes within DS Access needs to be enabled. For these event codes to be generated, specific SACLs are required.

Known False Positives

Creating a DNS entry matching this pattern is very unusual in a production environment. Filter as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Finding

Title	Entity Field	Entity Type	Risk Score
A possible Kerberos coercion DNS object was created $dest$	user	user	50

Intermediate Findings

Message	Entity Field	Entity Type	Risk Score
A possible Kerberos coercion DNS object was created $dest$	dest	system	50

References

Detection Testing

Test Type	Status	Dataset	Source	Sourcetype
Validation	✅ Passing	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Security`	`XmlWinEventLog`
Integration	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Security`	`XmlWinEventLog`

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 5