Detection: Windows OneDrive Share Mounted via Net
Description
The following analytic detects the use of net.exe or net1.exe to mount a OneDrive share as a network drive.
This behavior may indicate an attempt to stage, access, or exfiltrate data through a cloud-hosted WebDAV path rather than a traditional file share.
If confirmed malicious, an attacker could use the mounted share to move data outside the environment over trusted cloud infrastructure.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly`
3 count min(_time) as firstTime
4 max(_time) as lastTime
5
6from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where
7
8`process_net`
9Processes.process="*use*"
10Processes.process="*https://d.docs.live.net*"
11
12by Processes.process Processes.vendor_product Processes.user_id Processes.process_hash
13 Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process_exec Processes.action
14 Processes.dest Processes.process_current_directory Processes.process_path
15 Processes.process_integrity_level Processes.original_file_name Processes.parent_process
16 Processes.parent_process_path Processes.parent_process_guid Processes.parent_process_id
17 Processes.process_guid Processes.process_id Processes.user Processes.process_name
18
19
20| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
21
22| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
23
24| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
25
26| `windows_onedrive_share_mounted_via_net_filter`
Data Source
Macros Used
| Name |
Value |
| security_content_summariesonly |
summariesonly=summariesonly_config allow_old_summaries=oldsummaries_config fillnull_value=fillnull_config`` |
| windows_onedrive_share_mounted_via_net_filter |
search * |
windows_onedrive_share_mounted_via_net_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
| ID |
Technique |
Tactic |
| T1567.002 |
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage |
Exfiltration |
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
| Setting |
Value |
| Disabled |
true |
| Cron Schedule |
0 * * * * |
| Earliest Time |
-70m@m |
| Latest Time |
-10m@m |
| Schedule Window |
auto |
| Creates Finding (Notable) |
No |
| Creates Intermediate Finding (Risk Event) |
Yes |
Anomaly detections generate Intermediate Findings (Risk Events). They do not generate a Finding (Notable) directly.
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Legitimate users may mount OneDrive shares for synchronized access or backup purposes. Monitor for unauthorized or unusual mounting activity to reduce false alerts.
Associated Analytic Story
| Message |
Entity Field |
Entity Type |
Risk Score |
| Potential OneDrive share mounted on $dest$ via $process$. |
dest |
system |
20 |
Threat Objects
| Field |
Type |
| parent_process_name |
parent_process_name |
Detection Testing
| Test Type |
Status |
Dataset |
Source |
Sourcetype |
| Validation |
✅ Passing |
N/A |
N/A |
N/A |
| Unit |
✅ Passing |
Dataset |
XmlWinEventLog:Security |
XmlWinEventLog |
| Integration |
✅ Passing |
Dataset |
XmlWinEventLog:Security |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub |
Version: 2