ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1200 | Hardware Additions | Initial Access |
T1025 | Data from Removable Media | Collection |
T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media | Initial Access |
Detection: Windows Process Executed From Removable Media
Description
This analytic is used to identify when a removable media device is attached to a machine and then a process is executed from the same drive letter assigned to the removable media device. Adversaries and Insider Threats may use removable media devices for several malicious activities, including initial access, execution, and exfiltration.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as process min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_current_directory=* AND NOT Processes.process_current_directory IN ("C:\\*","*\\sysvol\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_current_directory
3
4| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
5
6| rex field=process_current_directory "^(?<object_handle>[^\\\]+\\\)"
7
8| where isnotnull(object_handle)
9
10| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
11
12| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
13
14| join dest,object_handle
15 [
16| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_value_data="*:\\*" AND Registry.registry_path="*USBSTOR*" AND Registry.registry_path IN ("HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows Portable Devices\\Devices\\*","HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Enum\\SWD\\WPDBUSENUM\\*") by Registry.dest,Registry.registry_value_data,Registry.registry_path
17
18| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
19
20| eval object_handle = registry_value_data, object_name = replace(mvindex(split(mvindex(split(registry_path, "??"),1),"&"),2),"PROD_","")
21 ]
22
23| `windows_process_executed_from_removable_media_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | N/A | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
Sysmon EventID 1 | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
|
Sysmon EventID 12 | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
|
Sysmon EventID 13 | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
windows_process_executed_from_removable_media_filter | search * |
windows_process_executed_from_removable_media_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search, you must ingest endpoint logging that tracks changes to the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows Portable Devices\Devices\ or HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\SWD\WPDBUSENUM\ registry keys as well as Process Execution commands. Ensure that the field from the event logs is being mapped to the proper fields in the Endpoint.Registry data model. This analytic joins the Process and Registry datamodels together based on the drive letter extract to the "object_handle" field from both datasets.
Known False Positives
Legitimate USB activity will also be detected. Please verify and investigate as appropriate.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message:
The process [$process_name$] was launched using files on a removable storage device named [$object_name$] by [$user$] on $dest$
Risk Object | Risk Object Type | Risk Score | Threat Objects |
---|---|---|---|
user | user | 35 | object_handle, object_name, process_name |
dest | system | 35 | object_handle, object_name, process_name |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 1