ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1110 | Brute Force | Credential Access |
T1110.003 | Password Spraying | Credential Access |
Detection: Windows Multiple NTLM Null Domain Authentications
Description
The following analytic detects when a device is the target of numerous NTLM authentications using a null domain. This activity generally results when an attacker attempts to brute force, password spray, or otherwise authenticate to a domain joined Windows device from a non-domain device. This activity may also generate a large number of EventID 4776 events in tandem, however these events will not indicate the attacker or target device
Search
1`ntlm_audit` EventCode IN (8004,8005,8006) DomainName=NULL UserName!=NULL
2| eval src = replace(WorkstationName,"\\\\","") ```CIM alignment, remove leading \\ from some auth attempts ```
3| eval dest = SChannelName, user = UserName ``` CIM alignment```
4| where SChannelName!=src ``` Remove NTLM auths to self, improves accuracy for certain applications```
5| `windows_multiple_ntlm_null_domain_authentications_filter`
6| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime dc(eval(upper(user))) as unique_count dc(eval(upper(src))) as src_count by dest
7| eventstats avg(unique_count) as unique_avg , stdev(unique_count) as unique_std
8| eval upperBound_unique=(1+unique_avg+unique_std*3) ``` adjust formula for sensitivity```
9| eval isOutlier=CASE(unique_count > upperBound_unique, 1, true(), 0)
10| where isOutlier==1
11| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
12| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
Data Source
No data sources specified for this detection.
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
ntlm_audit | sourcetype=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational OR source=XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational |
windows_multiple_ntlm_null_domain_authentications_filter | search * |
windows_multiple_ntlm_null_domain_authentications_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The following analytic requires that NTLM Operational logs to be imported from the environment Domain Controllers. This requires configuration of specific auditing settings, see Microsoft references for further guidance. This analytic is specific to EventID 8004~8006.
Known False Positives
Applications that deal with non-domain joined authentications. Recommend adjusting the upperBound_unique eval for tailoring the correlation to your environment, running with a 24hr search window will smooth out some statistical noise.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
The device [$dest$] was the target of $count$ NTLM authentications from $src_count$ sources using $unique_count$ unique user accounts. | 75 | 75 | 100 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-NTLM/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 2