Detection: Windows Modify Registry UpdateServiceUrlAlternate

Updated Date: 2024-05-20 ID: ca4e94fb-7969-4d63-8630-3625809a1f70 Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk Type: Anomaly Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects a suspicious modification to the Windows Update configuration registry key, specifically targeting the UpdateServiceUrlAlternate setting. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel to identify changes to this registry path. This activity is significant because adversaries, including malware like RedLine Stealer, exploit this technique to bypass detection and deploy additional payloads. If confirmed malicious, this modification could allow attackers to redirect update services, potentially leading to the execution of malicious code, further system compromise, and persistent evasion of security defenses.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\WindowsUpdate\\UpdateServiceUrlAlternate" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_key_name 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
6| `windows_modify_registry_updateserviceurlalternate_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source Supported App
Sysmon EventID 12 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' N/A

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_modify_registry_updateserviceurlalternate_filter search *
windows_modify_registry_updateserviceurlalternate_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1112 Modify Registry Defense Evasion
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_AE
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT19
APT32
APT38
APT41
Blue Mockingbird
Dragonfly
Earth Lusca
Ember Bear
FIN8
Gamaredon Group
Gorgon Group
Kimsuky
LuminousMoth
Magic Hound
Patchwork
Silence
TA505
Threat Group-3390
Turla
Wizard Spider

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type anomaly. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel in the Processes node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.

Known False Positives

Administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
A registry modification in Windows auto update configuration on $dest$ 25 50 50
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation ✅ Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 2