ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1574.009 | Path Interception by Unquoted Path | Defense Evasion |
T1574 | Hijack Execution Flow | Persistence |
Detection: Detect Path Interception By Creation Of program exe
Description
The following analytic identifies the creation of a program executable in an unquoted service path, a common technique for privilege escalation. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process creation events where the parent process is 'services.exe'. This activity is significant because unquoted service paths can be exploited by attackers to execute arbitrary code with elevated privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain higher-level access, potentially leading to full system compromise and persistent control over the affected endpoint.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=services.exe by Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process Processes.dest
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
4| rex field=process "^.*?\\\\(?<service_process>[^\\\\]*\.(?:exe
5|bat
6|com
7|ps1))"
8| eval process_name = lower(process_name)
9| eval service_process = lower(service_process)
10| where process_name != service_process
11| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
12| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
13| `detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | N/A | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
Sysmon EventID 1 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Windows Event Log Security 4688 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Security' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter | search * |
detect_path_interception_by_creation_of_program_exe_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
unknown
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ attempting to perform privilege escalation by using unquoted service paths. | 49 | 70 | 70 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 8