DSQuery Domain Discovery

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Description

The following analytic detects the execution of "dsquery.exe" with arguments targeting TrustedDomain queries directly from the command line. This behavior is identified using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) telemetry, focusing on process names and command-line arguments. This activity is significant as it often indicates domain trust discovery, a common step in lateral movement or privilege escalation by adversaries. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to map domain trusts, potentially leading to further exploitation and unauthorized access to trusted domains.

• Type: TTP
• Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
• Datamodel: Endpoint
• Last Updated: 2024-05-31
• Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
• ID: cc316032-924a-11eb-91a2-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1482	Domain Trust Discovery	Discovery

Kill Chain Phase

• Exploitation

NIST

• DE.CM

CIS20

• CIS 10

CVE

Search

| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=dsquery.exe Processes.process=*trustedDomain* by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `dsquery_domain_discovery_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

• security_content_ctime
• security_content_summariesonly

dsquery_domain_discovery_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

• _time
• Processes.dest
• Processes.user
• Processes.parent_process_name
• Processes.process_name
• Processes.process
• Processes.process_id
• Processes.parent_process_id

How To Implement

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Limited false positives. If there is a true false positive, filter based on command-line or parent process.

Associated Analytic Story

• Domain Trust Discovery
• Active Directory Discovery

RBA

Risk Score	Impact	Confidence	Message
72.0	80	90	An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified performing domain discovery on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$.

The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

• https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1482/T1482.md
• https://blog.harmj0y.net/redteaming/a-guide-to-attacking-domain-trusts/
• https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc732952(v=ws.11)
• https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/cc754232(v=ws.11)

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

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