ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking | Defense Evasion |
T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading | Persistence |
T1574 | Hijack Execution Flow | Privilege Escalation |
Detection: Windows Known Abused DLL Loaded Suspiciously
Description
The following analytic detects when DLLs with known abuse history are loaded from an unusual location. This activity may represent an attacker performing a DLL search order or sideload hijacking technique. These techniques are used to gain persistence as well as elevate privileges on the target system. This detection relies on Sysmon EID7 and is compatible with all Officla Sysmon TA versions.
Search
1`sysmon` ImageLoaded EventCode=7 NOT ImageLoaded IN ("*\\Program Files*","*\\system32\\*", "*\\syswow64\\*","*\\winsxs\\*","*\\wbem\\*")
2| stats latest(ProcessGuid) as process_guid, count, min(_time) as firstTime, max(_time) as lastTime by User, Computer, Image, ImageLoaded
3| rename User as user, Computer as dest, Image as process, ImageLoaded as loaded_file
4| eval process_name = case(isnotnull(process),replace(process,"(.*\\\)(?=.*(\.\w*)$
5|(\w+)$)","")), loaded_file_path = case(isnotnull(loaded_file), replace(loaded_file, "(:[\w\. ]+)", "")), loaded_file = case(isnotnull(loaded_file),replace(loaded_file,"(.*\\\)(?=.*(\.\w*)$
6|(\w+)$)","")), user = case(NOT user IN ("-"), replace(user, "(.*)\\\(.+)$","\2"))
7| lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS loaded_file OUTPUT islibrary comment as desc
8| lookup hijacklibs_loaded library AS loaded_file excludes as loaded_file_path OUTPUT islibrary as excluded
9| search islibrary = TRUE AND excluded = false
10| stats values(*) as * by dest, process_name, process, process_guid, loaded_file, loaded_file_path
11| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
12| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
13| `windows_known_abused_dll_loaded_suspiciously_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source | Supported App |
---|---|---|---|---|
Sysmon EventID 7 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
N/A |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
windows_known_abused_dll_loaded_suspiciously_filter | search * |
windows_known_abused_dll_loaded_suspiciously_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The following analytic requires Sysmon operational logs to be imported, with EID7 being mapped to the process_name field. Modify the sysmon macro as needed to match the sourcetype or add index.
Known False Positives
DLLs being loaded by user mode programs for legitimate reasons.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
The module [$loaded_file$] was loaded from an unusual location by [$process$] | 10 | 40 | 25 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 2