Detection: Windows Access Token Manipulation Winlogon Duplicate Token Handle

Description

The following analytic detects a process attempting to access winlogon.exe to duplicate its handle. This is identified using Sysmon EventCode 10, focusing on processes targeting winlogon.exe with specific access rights. This activity is significant because it is a common technique used by adversaries to escalate privileges by leveraging the high privileges and security tokens associated with winlogon.exe. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to gain elevated privileges, potentially leading to full system compromise and unauthorized access to sensitive information.

1`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage IN("*\\system32\\winlogon.exe*", "*\\SysWOW64\\winlogon.exe*") GrantedAccess = 0x1040 
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by SourceImage TargetImage SourceProcessGUID TargetProcessGUID SourceProcessId TargetProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace dest user_id 
3| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
5| `windows_access_token_manipulation_winlogon_duplicate_token_handle_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source Supported App
Sysmon EventID 10 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' N/A

Macros Used

Name Value
security_content_ctime convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)
windows_access_token_manipulation_winlogon_duplicate_token_handle_filter search *
windows_access_token_manipulation_winlogon_duplicate_token_handle_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1134.001 Token Impersonation/Theft Defense Evasion
T1134 Access Token Manipulation Privilege Escalation
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
NistCategory.DE_AE
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT28
FIN8
Blue Mockingbird
FIN6

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Risk Event False
This configuration file applies to all detections of type hunting.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records process activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the processes node. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.

Known False Positives

It is possible legitimate applications will request access to winlogon, filter as needed.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
A process $SourceImage$ is duplicating the handle token of winlogon.exe in $dest$ 36 60 60
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational xmlwineventlog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 3