|The following analytic identifies Regsvcs.exe with a network connection to a public IP address, exluding private IP space. This particular technique has been used in the wild to bypass application control products. Regasm.exe and Regsvcs.exe are signed by Microsoft. By contacting a remote command and control server, the adversary will have the ability to escalate privileges and complete the objectives. During investigation, identify and retrieve the content being loaded. Review parallel processes for additional suspicious behavior. Gather any other file modifications and review accordingly. Review the reputation of the remote IP or domain and block as needed. regsvcs.exe and regasm.exe are natively found in C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v*\regasm||regsvcs.exe and C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v*\regasm||regsvcs.exe.|
- Type: TTP
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2022-02-18
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: e3e7a1c0-f2b9-445c-8493-f30a63522d1a
Kill Chain Phase
- Actions on Objectives
- CIS 8
1 2 3 4 5 6 `sysmon` EventID=3 dest_ip!=10.0.0.0/12 dest_ip!=172.16.0.0/12 dest_ip!=192.168.0.0/16 process_name=regsvcs.exe | rename Computer as dest | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, user, process_name, src_ip, dest_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
detect_regsvcs_with_network_connection_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
List of fields required to use this analytic.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
Known False Positives
Although unlikely, limited instances of regsvcs.exe may cause a false positive. Filter based endpoint usage, command line arguments, or process lineage.
Associated Analytic Story
|80.0||80||100||An instance of $process_name$ contacting a remote destination was identified on endpoint $Computer$ by user $user$. This behavior is not normal for $process_name$.|
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
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