Windows Possible Credential Dumping
Description
The following analytic detects potential credential dumping by identifying specific GrantedAccess permission requests and CallTrace DLLs targeting the LSASS process. It leverages Sysmon EventCode 10 logs, focusing on access requests to lsass.exe and call traces involving debug and native API DLLs like dbgcore.dll, dbghelp.dll, and ntdll.dll. This activity is significant as credential dumping can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive credentials. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges and persist within the environment, posing a severe security risk.
- Type: TTP
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Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2024-08-14
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: e4723b92-7266-11ec-af45-acde48001122
Annotations
ATT&CK
Kill Chain Phase
- Exploitation
NIST
- DE.CM
CIS20
- CIS 10
CVE
Search
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`sysmon` EventCode=10 TargetImage=*\\lsass.exe granted_access IN ("0x01000", "0x1010", "0x1038", "0x40", "0x1400", "0x1fffff", "0x1410", "0x143a", "0x1438", "0x1000") CallTrace IN ("*dbgcore.dll*", "*dbghelp.dll*", "*ntdll.dll*", "*kernelbase.dll*", "*kernel32.dll*") NOT SourceUser IN ("NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM", "NT AUTHORITY\\NETWORK SERVICE")
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, SourceImage, GrantedAccess, TargetImage, SourceProcessId, SourceUser, TargetUser
| rename SourceUser as user
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
| `windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter`
Macros
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
windows_possible_credential_dumping_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Required fields
List of fields required to use this analytic.
- _time
- dest
- TargetImage
- GrantedAccess
- SourceImage
- SourceProcessId
- SourceUser
- TargetUser
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the process name, parent process, and command-line executions from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA. Enabling EventCode 10 TargetProcess lsass.exe is required.
Known False Positives
False positives will occur based on GrantedAccess 0x1010 and 0x1400, filter based on source image as needed or remove them. Concern is Cobalt Strike usage of Mimikatz will generate 0x1010 initially, but later be caught.
Associated Analytic Story
- Detect Zerologon Attack
- CISA AA22-264A
- Credential Dumping
- CISA AA23-347A
- DarkSide Ransomware
- CISA AA22-257A
RBA
Risk Score | Impact | Confidence | Message |
---|---|---|---|
64.0 | 80 | 80 | A process, $SourceImage$, has loaded $TargetImage$ that are typically related to credential dumping on $dest$. Review for further details. |
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.
Reference
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Local_Security_Authority_Subsystem_Service
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump
- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
- https://raw.githubusercontent.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit/master/Exfiltration/Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/procthread/process-security-and-access-rights?redirectedfrom=MSDN
- https://github.com/redcanaryco/AtomicTestHarnesses/blob/master/Windows/TestHarnesses/T1003.001_DumpLSASS/DumpLSASS.ps1
Test Dataset
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
source | version: 5