Detection: Windows Remote Access Software RMS Registry

Updated Date: 2024-11-13 ID: e5b7b5a9-e471-4be8-8c5d-4083983ba329 Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk Type: TTP Product: Splunk Enterprise Security

Description

The following analytic detects the creation or modification of Windows registry entries related to the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) Remote Admin tool. It leverages data from the Endpoint.Registry datamodel, focusing on registry paths containing "SYSTEM\Remote Manipulator System." This activity is significant because RMS, while legitimate, is often abused by adversaries, such as in the Azorult malware campaigns, to gain unauthorized remote access. If confirmed malicious, this could allow attackers to remotely control the targeted host, leading to potential data exfiltration, system manipulation, or further network compromise.

Search

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path= "*\\SYSTEM\\Remote Manipulator System*" by Registry.action Registry.dest Registry.process_guid Registry.process_id Registry.registry_hive Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_data Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_type Registry.status Registry.user Registry.vendor_product 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `windows_remote_access_software_rms_registry_filter`

Data Source

Name	Platform	Sourcetype	Source
Sysmon EventID 13	Windows	`'xmlwineventlog'`	`'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'`

Macros Used

Name	Value
security_content_ctime	`convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$)`
windows_remote_access_software_rms_registry_filter	`search *`

windows_remote_access_software_rms_registry_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK

+ Kill Chain Phases

+ NIST

+ CIS

- Threat Actors

ID	Technique	Tactic
T1219	Remote Access Software	Command And Control

Command and Control

DE.CM

CIS 10

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting	Value
Disabled	true
Cron Schedule	`0 * * * *`
Earliest Time	`-70m@m`
Latest Time	`-10m@m`
Schedule Window	`auto`
Creates Notable	Yes
Rule Title	`%name%`
Rule Description	`%description%`
Notable Event Fields	user, dest
Creates Risk Event	True

This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on process that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint datamodel in the Registry node. Also make sure that this registry was included in your config files ex. sysmon config to be monitored.

Known False Positives

administrators may enable or disable this feature that may cause some false positive.

Associated Analytic Story

Azorult

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message:

the registry related to RMS tool is created on $dest$

Risk Object	Risk Object Type	Risk Score	Threat Objects
dest	system	90	No Threat Objects

References

Detection Testing

Test Type	Status	Dataset	Source	Sourcetype
Validation	✅ Passing	N/A	N/A	N/A
Unit	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`	`XmlWinEventLog`
Integration	✅ Passing	Dataset	`XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational`	`XmlWinEventLog`

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

Source: GitHub | Version: 6