ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1055 | Process Injection | Defense Evasion |
T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection | Privilege Escalation |
Detection: Loading Of Dynwrapx Module
Description
The following analytic detects the loading of the dynwrapx.dll module, which is associated with the DynamicWrapperX ActiveX component. This detection leverages Sysmon EventCode 7 to identify processes that load or register dynwrapx.dll. This activity is significant because DynamicWrapperX can be used to call Windows API functions in scripts, making it a potential tool for malicious actions. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code, escalate privileges, or maintain persistence on the host. Immediate investigation of parallel processes and registry modifications is recommended.
Search
1`sysmon` EventCode=7 (ImageLoaded = "*\\dynwrapx.dll" OR OriginalFileName = "dynwrapx.dll" OR Product = "DynamicWrapperX")
2| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by Image ImageLoaded OriginalFileName Product process_name dest EventCode Signed ProcessId
3| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
4| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
5| `loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source | Supported App |
---|---|---|---|---|
Sysmon EventID 7 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
N/A |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter | search * |
loading_of_dynwrapx_module_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search you need to be ingesting information on processes that include the name of the process responsible for the changes from your endpoints into the Endpoint
datamodel in the Processes
and Filesystem
node. In addition, confirm the latest CIM App 4.20 or higher is installed and the latest TA for the endpoint product.
Known False Positives
False positives should be limited, however it is possible to filter by Processes.process_name and specific processes (ex. wscript.exe). Filter as needed. This may need modification based on EDR telemetry and how it brings in registry data. For example, removal of (Default).
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
dynwrapx.dll loaded by process $process_name$ on $dest$ | 80 | 80 | 100 |
References
-
https://blog.f-secure.com/hunting-for-koadic-a-com-based-rootkit/
-
https://bohops.com/2018/06/28/abusing-com-registry-structure-clsid-localserver32-inprocserver32/
-
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cb77b93150cb0f7fe65ce8a7e2a5781e727419451355a7736db84109fa215a89
-
https://malpedia.caad.fkie.fraunhofer.de/details/win.asyncrat
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
xmlwineventlog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
xmlwineventlog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 2