Detection: CMD Echo Pipe - Escalation

Description

The following analytic identifies the use of named-pipe impersonation for privilege escalation, commonly associated with Cobalt Strike and similar frameworks. It detects command-line executions where cmd.exe uses echo to write to a named pipe, such as cmd.exe /c echo 4sgryt3436 > \\.\Pipe\5erg53. This detection leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process and command-line telemetry. This activity is significant as it indicates potential privilege escalation attempts. If confirmed malicious, attackers could gain elevated privileges, enabling further compromise and persistence within the environment.

1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where `process_cmd` OR Processes.process=*%comspec%* (Processes.process=*echo* AND Processes.process=*pipe*) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.original_file_name Processes.process Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id 
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` 
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
6| `cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter`

Data Source

Name Platform Sourcetype Source
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 N/A 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' 'crowdstrike'
Sysmon EventID 1 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational'
Windows Event Log Security 4688 Windows icon Windows 'xmlwineventlog' 'XmlWinEventLog:Security'

Macros Used

Name Value
process_cmd (Processes.process_name=cmd.exe OR Processes.original_file_name=Cmd.Exe)
cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter search *
cmd_echo_pipe___escalation_filter is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Annotations

- MITRE ATT&CK
+ Kill Chain Phases
+ NIST
+ CIS
- Threat Actors
ID Technique Tactic
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter Execution
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Execution
T1543.003 Windows Service Persistence
T1543 Create or Modify System Process Privilege Escalation
KillChainPhase.EXPLOITAITON
KillChainPhase.INSTALLATION
NistCategory.DE_CM
Cis18Value.CIS_10
APT19
APT32
APT37
APT39
Dragonfly
FIN5
FIN6
FIN7
Fox Kitten
Ke3chang
OilRig
Saint Bear
Stealth Falcon
Whitefly
Windigo
Winter Vivern
APT1
APT18
APT28
APT3
APT32
APT37
APT38
APT41
APT5
Agrius
Aquatic Panda
BRONZE BUTLER
Blue Mockingbird
Chimera
Cinnamon Tempest
Cobalt Group
Dark Caracal
Darkhotel
Dragonfly
FIN10
FIN13
FIN6
FIN7
FIN8
Fox Kitten
GALLIUM
Gamaredon Group
Gorgon Group
HAFNIUM
Higaisa
INC Ransom
Indrik Spider
Ke3chang
Kimsuky
Lazarus Group
LazyScripter
Machete
Magic Hound
Metador
MuddyWater
Mustang Panda
Nomadic Octopus
OilRig
Patchwork
Play
Rancor
RedCurl
Saint Bear
Silence
Sowbug
Suckfly
TA505
TA551
TA577
TeamTNT
Threat Group-1314
Threat Group-3390
ToddyCat
Tropic Trooper
Turla
Volt Typhoon
Winter Vivern
Wizard Spider
ZIRCONIUM
admin@338
menuPass
APT19
APT3
APT32
APT38
APT41
Agrius
Aquatic Panda
Blue Mockingbird
Carbanak
Cinnamon Tempest
Cobalt Group
DarkVishnya
Earth Lusca
FIN7
Ke3chang
Kimsuky
Lazarus Group
PROMETHIUM
TeamTNT
Threat Group-3390
Tropic Trooper
Wizard Spider

Default Configuration

This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:

Setting Value
Disabled true
Cron Schedule 0 * * * *
Earliest Time -70m@m
Latest Time -10m@m
Schedule Window auto
Creates Notable Yes
Rule Title %name%
Rule Description %description%
Notable Event Fields user, dest
Creates Risk Event True
This configuration file applies to all detections of type TTP. These detections will use Risk Based Alerting and generate Notable Events.

Implementation

The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes node of the Endpoint data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.

Known False Positives

Unknown. It is possible filtering may be required to ensure fidelity.

Associated Analytic Story

Risk Based Analytics (RBA)

Risk Message Risk Score Impact Confidence
An instance of $parent_process_name$ spawning $process_name$ was identified on endpoint $dest$ by user $user$ potentially performing privilege escalation using named pipes related to Cobalt Strike and other frameworks. 64 80 80
The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

References

Detection Testing

Test Type Status Dataset Source Sourcetype
Validation Passing N/A N/A N/A
Unit Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog
Integration ✅ Passing Dataset XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational XmlWinEventLog

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range


Source: GitHub | Version: 6