ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Execution |
Detection: Excessive number of taskhost processes
Description
The following analytic identifies an excessive number of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe processes running within a short time frame. It leverages data from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents, focusing on process names and their counts. This behavior is significant as it is commonly associated with post-exploitation tools like Meterpreter and Koadic, which use multiple instances of these processes for actions such as discovery and lateral movement. If confirmed malicious, this activity could indicate an ongoing attack, allowing attackers to execute code, escalate privileges, or move laterally within the network.
Search
1
2| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` values(Processes.process_id) as process_ids min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Processes WHERE Processes.process_name = "taskhost.exe" OR Processes.process_name = "taskhostex.exe" BY Processes.dest Processes.process_name _time span=1h
3| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
4| eval pid_count=mvcount(process_ids)
5| eval taskhost_count_=if(process_name == "taskhost.exe", pid_count, 0)
6| eval taskhostex_count_=if(process_name == "taskhostex.exe", pid_count, 0)
7| stats sum(taskhost_count_) as taskhost_count, sum(taskhostex_count_) as taskhostex_count by _time, dest, firstTime, lastTime
8| where taskhost_count > 10 or taskhostex_count > 10
9| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
10| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
11| `excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source | Supported App |
---|---|---|---|---|
CrowdStrike ProcessRollup2 | N/A | 'crowdstrike:events:sensor' |
'crowdstrike' |
N/A |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter | search * |
excessive_number_of_taskhost_processes_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
The detection is based on data that originates from Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) agents. These agents are designed to provide security-related telemetry from the endpoints where the agent is installed. To implement this search, you must ingest logs that contain the process GUID, process name, and parent process. Additionally, you must ingest complete command-line executions. These logs must be processed using the appropriate Splunk Technology Add-ons that are specific to the EDR product. The logs must also be mapped to the Processes
node of the Endpoint
data model. Use the Splunk Common Information Model (CIM) to normalize the field names and speed up the data modeling process.
Known False Positives
Administrators, administrative actions or certain applications may run many instances of taskhost and taskhostex concurrently. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
An excessive amount of taskhost.exe and taskhostex.exe was executed on $dest$ indicative of suspicious behavior. | 56 | 80 | 70 |
References
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Security |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Security |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 4