ID | Technique | Tactic |
---|---|---|
T1543.003 | Windows Service | Persistence |
T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | Privilege Escalation |
Detection: Suspicious Driver Loaded Path
Description
The following analytic detects the loading of drivers from suspicious paths, which is a technique often used by malicious software such as coin miners (e.g., xmrig). It leverages Sysmon EventCode 6 to identify drivers loaded from non-standard directories. This activity is significant because legitimate drivers typically reside in specific system directories, and deviations may indicate malicious activity. If confirmed malicious, this could allow an attacker to execute code at the kernel level, potentially leading to privilege escalation, persistence, or further system compromise.
Search
1`sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = "*.sys" NOT (ImageLoaded IN("*\\WINDOWS\\inf","*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\drivers\\*", "*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*"))
2| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by dest ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed
3| rename ImageLoaded as file_name
4| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
5| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
6| `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`
Data Source
Name | Platform | Sourcetype | Source |
---|---|---|---|
Sysmon EventID 6 | Windows | 'xmlwineventlog' |
'XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational' |
Macros Used
Name | Value |
---|---|
security_content_ctime | convert timeformat="%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S" ctime($field$) |
suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter | search * |
suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter
is an empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
Annotations
Default Configuration
This detection is configured by default in Splunk Enterprise Security to run with the following settings:
Setting | Value |
---|---|
Disabled | true |
Cron Schedule | 0 * * * * |
Earliest Time | -70m@m |
Latest Time | -10m@m |
Schedule Window | auto |
Creates Notable | Yes |
Rule Title | %name% |
Rule Description | %description% |
Notable Event Fields | user, dest |
Creates Risk Event | True |
Implementation
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
Known False Positives
Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers
Associated Analytic Story
Risk Based Analytics (RBA)
Risk Message | Risk Score | Impact | Confidence |
---|---|---|---|
Suspicious driver $file_name$ on $dest$ | 63 | 70 | 90 |
References
-
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/hk/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.ps1.powtran.a/
-
https://redcanary.com/blog/tracking-driver-inventory-to-expose-rootkits/
Detection Testing
Test Type | Status | Dataset | Source | Sourcetype |
---|---|---|---|---|
Validation | ✅ Passing | N/A | N/A | N/A |
Unit | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Integration | ✅ Passing | Dataset | XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational |
XmlWinEventLog |
Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py
tool or the UI.
Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range
Source: GitHub | Version: 3