The following analytic identifies a source process name failing to authenticate with multiple users. This behavior could represent an adversary performing a Password Spraying attack against an Active Directory environment to obtain initial access or elevate privileges. Event 4625 generates on domain controllers, member servers, and workstations when an account fails to logon. Logon Type 2 describes an iteractive logon attempt.
The detection calculates the standard deviation for each host and leverages the 3-sigma statistical rule to identify an unusual number of users. To customize this analytic, users can try different combinations of the
bucket span time and the calculation of the
upperBound field. This logic can be used for real time security monitoring as well as threat hunting exercises.
This detection will trigger on the potenfially malicious host, perhaps controlled via a trojan or operated by an insider threat, from where a password spraying attack is being executed. This could be a domain controller as well as a member server or workstation.
The analytics returned fields allow analysts to investigate the event further by providing fields like source process name, source account and attempted user accounts.
- Type: Anomaly
Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Last Updated: 2021-04-13
- Author: Mauricio Velazco, Splunk
- ID: 9015385a-9c84-11eb-bef2-acde48001122
Kill Chain Phase
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=2 Caller_Process_Name!="-" | bucket span=2m _time | eval Source_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 0) | eval Destination_Account = mvindex(Account_Name, 1) | stats dc(Destination_Account) AS unique_accounts values(Account_Name) as tried_accounts by _time, Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eventstats avg(unique_accounts) as comp_avg , stdev(unique_accounts) as comp_std by Caller_Process_Name, Source_Account, ComputerName | eval upperBound=(comp_avg+comp_std*3) | eval isOutlier=if(unique_accounts > 10 and unique_accounts >= upperBound, 1, 0) | search isOutlier=1 | `multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that multiple_users_failing_to_authenticate_from_process_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Event Logs from domain controllers aas well as member servers and workstations. The Advanced Security Audit policy setting
Audit Logon within
Logon/Logoff needs to be enabled.
Known False Positives
A process failing to authenticate with multiple users is not a common behavior for legitimate user sessions. Possible false positive scenarios include but are not limited to vulnerability scanners and missconfigured systems.
Associated Analytic story
|49.0||70||70||Potential password spraying attack from $ComputerName$|
source | version: 1