WARNING THIS IS A EXPERIMENTAL object

We have not been able to test, simulate, or build datasets for this object. Use at your own risk. This analytic is NOT supported.

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Description

This analytic is to detect a suspicious modification or new registry entry regarding print processor. This registry is known to be abuse by turla or other APT to gain persistence and privilege escalation to the compromised machine. This is done by adding the malicious dll payload on the new created key in this registry that will be executed as it restarted the spoolsv.exe process and services.

  • Type: TTP
  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
  • Datamodel: Endpoint
  • Last Updated: 2021-09-28
  • Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
  • ID: 1f5b68aa-2037-11ec-898e-acde48001122

Annotations

ATT&CK
ID Technique Tactic
T1547.012 Print Processors Persistence, Privilege Escalation
T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution Persistence, Privilege Escalation
Kill Chain Phase
  • Exploitation
NIST
CIS20
CVE
1
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| tstats `security_content_summariesonly` count  min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime FROM datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path ="*\\Control\\Print\\Environments\\Windows x64\\Print Processors*" by Registry.dest  Registry.user Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_key_name Registry.registry_value_name 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` 
| `print_processor_registry_autostart_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

Note that print_processor_registry_autostart_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required field

  • _time
  • Registry.dest
  • Registry.user
  • Registry.registry_path
  • Registry.registry_key_name
  • Registry.registry_value_name

How To Implement

To successfully implement this search, you must be ingesting data that records registry activity from your hosts to populate the endpoint data model in the registry node. This is typically populated via endpoint detection-and-response product, such as Carbon Black or endpoint data sources, such as Sysmon. The data used for this search is typically generated via logs that report reads and writes to the registry.

Known False Positives

possible new printer installation may add driver component on this registry.

Associated Analytic story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
80.0 80 100 modified/added/deleted registry entry $Registry.registry_path$ in $dest$

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

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