This analytic will detect suspicious driver loaded paths. This technique is commonly used by malicious software like coin miners (xmrig) to register its malicious driver from notable directories where executable or drivers do not commonly exist. During triage, validate this driver is for legitimate business use. Review the metadata and certificate information. Unsigned drivers from non-standard paths is not normal, but occurs. In addition, review driver loads into
ntoskrnl.exe for possible other drivers of interest. Long tail analyze drivers by path (outside of default, and in default) for further review.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2021-04-29
- Author: Teoderick Contreras, Splunk
- ID: f880acd4-a8f1-11eb-a53b-acde48001122
Kill Chain Phase
1 2 3 4 5 `sysmon` EventCode=6 ImageLoaded = "*.sys" NOT (ImageLoaded IN("*\\WINDOWS\\inf","*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\drivers\\*", "*\\WINDOWS\\System32\\DriverStore\\FileRepository\\*")) | stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count by Computer ImageLoaded Hashes IMPHASH Signature Signed | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that suspicious_driver_loaded_path_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting logs with the driver loaded and Signature from your endpoints. If you are using Sysmon, you must have at least version 6.0.4 of the Sysmon TA.
Known False Positives
Limited false positives will be present. Some applications do load drivers
Associated Analytic story
|63.0||70||90||Suspicious driver $ImageLoaded$ on $Computer$|
source | version: 1