The following analytic identifies a local successful authentication event on a Windows endpoint using the Kerberos package. The target user security identified will be set to the built-in local Administrator account, along with the remote address as localhost - 127.0.0.1. This may be indicative of a kerberos relay attack. Upon triage, review for recently ran binaries on disk. In addition, look for new computer accounts added to Active Directory and other anomolous AD events.
- Type: TTP
- Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud
- Datamodel: Endpoint
- Last Updated: 2022-04-27
- Author: Michael Haag, Splunk
- ID: 8309c3a8-4d34-48ae-ad66-631658214653
|T1558||Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets||Credential Access|
Kill Chain Phase
- CIS 3
- CIS 5
- CIS 16
1 2 3 4 5 `wineventlog_security` EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3 Authentication_Package=Kerberos action=success src_ip=127.0.0.1 | stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by dest, subject, action, Security_ID, user, Account_Name, src_ip | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | `windows_kerberos_local_successful_logon_filter`
The SPL above uses the following Macros:
Note that windows_kerberos_local_successful_logon_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.
How To Implement
To successfully implement this search, you need to be ingesting Windows Security Event Logs with 4624 EventCode enabled. The Windows TA is also required.
Known False Positives
False positives are possible, filtering may be required to restrict to workstations vs domain controllers. Filter as needed.
Associated Analytic story
|64.0||80||80||A successful localhost Kerberos authentication event occurred on $dest$, possibly indicative of Kerberos relay attack.|
source | version: 1