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Description

The following analytic detects an AWS CloudTrail event where a user with permissions updates the login profile of another user. It leverages CloudTrail logs to identify instances where the user making the change is different from the user whose profile is being updated. This activity is significant because it can indicate privilege escalation attempts, where an attacker uses a compromised account to gain higher privileges. If confirmed malicious, this could allow the attacker to escalate their privileges, potentially leading to unauthorized access and control over sensitive resources within the AWS environment.

  • Type: TTP

  • Product: Splunk Enterprise, Splunk Enterprise Security, Splunk Cloud

  • Last Updated: 2024-05-17
  • Author: Bhavin Patel, Splunk
  • ID: 2a9b80d3-6a40-4115-11ad-212bf3d0d111

Annotations

ATT&CK

ATT&CK

ID Technique Tactic
T1136.003 Cloud Account Persistence
T1136 Create Account Persistence
Kill Chain Phase
  • Installation
NIST
  • DE.CM
CIS20
  • CIS 10
CVE 


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 `cloudtrail` eventName = UpdateLoginProfile userAgent !=console.amazonaws.com errorCode = success 
| eval match=if(match(userIdentity.userName,requestParameters.userName), 1,0) 
| search match=0 
| stats count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime by requestParameters.userName src eventName eventSource aws_account_id errorCode userAgent eventID awsRegion userIdentity.userName user_arn 
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` 
| `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` 
| `aws_updateloginprofile_filter`

Macros

The SPL above uses the following Macros:

:information_source: aws_updateloginprofile_filter is a empty macro by default. It allows the user to filter out any results (false positives) without editing the SPL.

Required fields

List of fields required to use this analytic.

  • _time
  • eventName
  • userAgent
  • errorCode
  • requestParameters.userName

How To Implement

You must install splunk AWS add on and Splunk App for AWS. This search works with AWS CloudTrail logs.

Known False Positives

While this search has no known false positives, it is possible that an AWS admin has legitimately created keys for another user.

Associated Analytic Story

RBA

Risk Score Impact Confidence Message
30.0 50 60 From IP address $src$, user agent $userAgent$ has trigged an event $eventName$ for updating the existing login profile, potentially giving user $user_arn$ more access privilleges

:information_source: The Risk Score is calculated by the following formula: Risk Score = (Impact * Confidence/100). Initial Confidence and Impact is set by the analytic author.

Reference

Test Dataset

Replay any dataset to Splunk Enterprise by using our replay.py tool or the UI. Alternatively you can replay a dataset into a Splunk Attack Range

source | version: 4